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The big four Australian banks have received international accolades for their sustainability efforts.  At 
the 2014 World Economic Forum, Westpac was named the most sustainable company in the world1, 
with former chief Gail Kelly being “[…] delighted that Westpac’s sustainability performance has been 
rated so highly on the global stage.”2 ANZ was named as the global banking sector leader in the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index, a major reference point for sustainable investors, six times in the last seven 
years3, while NAB4 and the Commonwealth Bank5 have likewise been recognised for their sustainability 
performance. 
Despite these accolades, a number of recent controversies have stimulated public debate about the 
social and environmental responsibilities of the banking industry.
Australian banks have suffered public outrage as a result of dubious financial advice costing thousands 
their life savings, disputed credit card fees, rate-fixing, and insider trading, as well as the funding of 
unsustainable activities such as coal mining and infrastructure projects along the great barrier reef, 
nuclear arms manufacturing, and land grabs in emerging economies. As a result, confidence in banks is 
low: according to a national survey performed by the Australia Institute, 76% of respondents believe that 
banks put profits before their social and environmental responsibilities. 
How can these two conflicting pictures of the banking sector be explained? 
This report examines both the sustainability in the Australian and global banking sectors and the 
assessment indicators. Specifically, it assesses self-regulatory and voluntary measures aimed at 
producing socially and environmentally responsible banking.
An overview of the social and environmental performance of Australian and international banks using 
commonly accepted sustainability indicators reveals a schism exists between symbolic and substantive 
sustainability efforts. Simultaneously scrutinising these indicators by assessing how effectively they 
measure the performance and commitment of banks makes it apparent that while many Australian and 
overseas banks perform well according to the indicators, their business strategy and practices may fail 
to meet three key challenges: misaligned incentives, information asymmetry, and effective management 
of social and environmental risk.
The report concludes by recommending increased integration of corporate responsibilities in 
authoritative frameworks, a measure aimed at redressing the unbalanced configuration of public, 
civil and corporate governance frameworks, which currently favours corporate voluntarism and self-
regulation.
Specifically, significant steps towards overcoming the three challenges are:
• reformulating company directors’ duties to include social and environmental responsibilities, 
• redefining sustainability reporting requirements and enshrining these in corporate governance 
systems, 
• and founding social and environmental risk assessments on the precautionary principle, which shifts 
the burden of proof towards those parties that potentially cause harm.
1. INTRODUCTION




The ‘four pillars’ of the Australian banking system are a uniquely dominant part of the Australian 
economy. The four big Australian banks, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia Bank (NAB), and Westpac Banking 
Corporation (WBC) are all featured in the top five of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200. In 
the weighting for each sector represented in the index, the financial sector dwarfs others industries: the 
financial sector makes up 46.5% of the total ASX 200 market capitalisation, followed at a distance by 
the materials sector representing 15.4%.6 
The big banks hold $AUD 522 billion of Australian household deposits, equal to one-third of Australia’s 
gross domestic product.7 In the 2013-14 financial year, their pre-tax profit was 87.5% of total bank 
profits8 and 2.7% of national income.9 In the words of David Murray, former CBA-boss and chair 
of the Financial System Inquiry: “[…] banks fund most of the assets in the economy – whether it’s 
businesses, governments themselves, homes or projects, whatever else. And because they do that, 
banks in aggregate are themselves monsters… They have monstrous balance sheets and therefore 
make a lot of profit.”10 
According to the chairman of ANZ, David Gonski, Australians ought to “stop bashing the banks” for 
being large and profitable.11 This comment should put civil society on guard. The market dominance of 
banks results in great market power, as well as great responsibility. The impact of banking is measured 
through operations in offices and branches, as well as through financing, which can lead to involvement 
in unsustainable practices. As banks provide the majority of external finance to firms and governments, 
they can influence their practices. Research shows that bank lending potentially has more impact on 
sustainable enterprise than investment and divestment on the stock market.12
Banks can thus wield their enormous market power to support sustainable activities, while their 
actions can likewise contribute to detrimental behaviour. The global financial crisis has shown that 
unsustainable banking activities do not only spread through the economic system but also endanger 
it.13 This begs the question to what degree banks, apart from posing systemic risks, can contribute to, or 
alternatively mitigate social and environmental harm, and what are the resulting responsibilities of banks 
towards the community and the environment?
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RESPONSIBILITIES
In 2005, a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services in Australia 
launched an inquiry into Corporate Responsibility and Triple Bottom Line reporting. Specifically, it 
examined whether companies regard the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, and 
the extent to which the Australian legal framework that governs directors’ duties encourages or 
discourages them from considering stakeholder and community interests. The inquiry furthermore 
examined the desirability of legal revisions, the suitability of voluntary measures, and the 
appropriateness of reporting requirements.14 
The Committee found that legal amendments were undesirable, as it deemed it “[…] not appropriate to 
mandate the consideration of stakeholder interests into directors’ duties.” Furthermore, the Committee 
recommended that sustainability reporting should remain voluntary, fearing that “[…] mandatory 
reporting would lead to a ‘tick-the-box’ culture of compliance.”15 The Committee made a specific 
recommendation regarding the inclusion of appropriate guidance in the ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations, which in 2011 led to guidance pertaining to gender diversity16, 
followed by further guidance in 2014 concerning the disclosure and mitigation of environmental and 
social risks.17 
The emphasis on voluntary social and environmental efforts is problematic. According to illustrious 
economists such as Adam Smith and Milton Friedman, economic efficiency through specialisation is 
vital in wealth creation and market functioning. The question of whether business has duties beyond 
value creation is thus dismissed: “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”18 
Simultaneously, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, as well as 
the advocates of the let business be business argument, likewise oppose public policy aimed at keeping 
business in check. 
The outcome is a catch-22: the seemingly inescapable absence of measures to mitigate negative effects 
of business activities on society and the environment.
For a long time, market mechanisms were thought to provide the solution to the deadlock between the 
role of government and business. Unconditional trust in the market offered the blueprint for laissez-
faire capitalism, with the maxim of the invisible hand reigning supreme. Yet the global financial crisis 
demonstrated that without adequate intervention from non-market forces, the pursuit of self-interest and 
economic gain does not create desired outcomes for society, but instead has the capacity to devastate it. 
Hence, markets should not be regarded as forces that miraculously create desired outcomes. Instead, 
they are man-made, imperfect, and in need of correction and supervision. 
SUPERVISION
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, regulators were pushed to exercise more supervision 
over financial services providers, and be less trusting of self-regulatory efforts.19 According to the 
International Monetary Fund, Australian banks were resilient to the crisis because of sound regulation 
and supervision: “Prudential rules, often tighter than the minimum international standards [...] together 
with a proactive approach to supervision, helped maintain a healthy and stable financial sector.”20 In the 
view of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), responsible for oversight of the financial 
sector, application of global standards, adapted where needed, formed an important basis of the good 
international standing of Australian banks.21 
Despite the fact that the Australian financial sector and the economy survived the global financial crisis 
relatively unscathed, the Government launched the Financial System Inquiry in 2013. The Inquiry 
examined how the Australian financial system could be improved to further economic growth and be 
better equipped to deal with financial crises. The final report, presented in December 2014, featured 
key recommendations concerning increased banking capital requirements, narrower mortgage risk-
weights, minimum leverage ratios, minimum education standards for financial advisors, changes in the 
law to enhance consumer protection, and the establishment of an assessment board that evaluates the 
performance of financial sector regulators.22 
Regrettably, the terms of reference of the Financial System Inquiry did not address social and 
environmental sustainability and risks in the financial sector. 
It seems that the readiness to increase supervision concerning financial conduct, in order to avoid 
financial risks to the economy and consumers, is not matched by a similar willingness to supervise 
and regulate the social and environmental impacts of the financial sector. In spite of widespread 
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concerns about climate change, human rights abuses, and political instability, we continue to rely on 
the self-regulatory efforts of Australian banks regarding funding of the fossil fuel industry, land grabs in 
developing countries, and nuclear arms production.
A nation-wide survey by The Australia Institute indicates that only 26% of respondents believe banks will 
behave ethically and responsibly if they regulate themselves, while merely 49% of survey respondents 
are confident that banks comply with Government regulation. These figures show the Australian 
public’s widespread mistrust of banks, and raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of social and 
environmental self-regulation by banks. A number of key challenges are discussed below that will need 
to be overcome in order to establish truly sustainable banking practices.
CHALLENGES
Short-termism, performance rewards, and maximising shareholder value have long been the norm in 
the financial sector. Yet the focus on immediate returns while neglecting long-term risks is increasingly 
criticised. While performance rewards and shareholder value creation are not harmful, they become 
damaging when disproportionally focused on the short-term, which can incite unethical conduct and 
risk-taking for the sake of instant rewards. Conversely, a sustainable bank would equally consider 
financial, environmental and social factors, while aligning its own interests with that of the community 
through long-term financial and non-financial value creation, for shareholders and stakeholders alike. 
Information asymmetry is another obstacle that banks will need to overcome. Whenever there is 
asymmetric knowledge in a transaction, there is a risk that the party with superior knowledge will exploit 
it for their own benefit, which leads to moral hazards. Information asymmetry and moral hazards are not 
limited to commercial transactions however: absent or incorrect social and environmental information 
can also misinform stakeholders about the exact impact of activities. It must be noted that this is a two-
way street: banks can equally fall victim to moral hazards, for example by being misinformed or misled 
by firms seeking financing. In order to decrease information asymmetry and the risk of moral hazards, 
sustainable banks would aim to improve transparency and monitoring.
Lastly, banks need to manage risk more effectively. The global financial crisis demonstrated that 
financial risk-taking can bring the international financial system to the brink of collapse. This begs 
the question of what the consequences of excessive social and environmental risk-taking might be, 
as risk does not merely concern financial elements, but also society and the environment. The main 
challenge of responsible business and banking enterprise is no longer merely how to mitigate negative 
externalities, but rather how to find ways to anticipate and prevent negative impacts. This precautionary 
strategy is a critical step towards corporate responsibility that goes beyond symbolic efforts and implies a 
major change to the overarching business model.23
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PERFORMANCE
The following sections will examine the sustainability performance of banks, which in the 
context of this report will entail the self-regulatory efforts aimed at environmental, social and 
governance matters. The performance of the big four Australian banks will be gauged and 
compared to the 20 largest global banks by market capitalisation24 and the 20 largest banks 
measured in assets.25 Overlap in these lists results in a sample of 29 banks, including ANZ, 
CBA and WBC. The addition of NAB results in a list of 30 banks (appendix A). 
The assessment builds on existing research into sustainable banking, which outlines 
performance by looking at sustainable products, services, and risk management.26 
Supplementary to this research are studies that examine how corporate governance is used 
to develop and implement corporate responsibility strategies.27 Combining and updating the 
indicators from these studies offers an extensive approach to evaluate self-regulatory efforts 
by banks, using 37 indicators in four categories: (1) voluntary disclosures; (2) responsible 
finance; (3) stakeholder engagement; and (4) corporate governance (appendix B). 
The assessment outlined above examines whether a bank addresses a particular 
sustainability indicator in public disclosures. The report will supplement this quantitative 
analysis by qualitatively analysing the indicators and the scores to ascertain how accurately 
sustainability performance is measured. The qualitative analysis will use data obtained 
from a national survey conducted by The Australia Institute in 2015, as well as academic 
publications, reports by civil society organisations, and media sources.
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2. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES
Reporting
Every bank in the sample addresses sustainability in public reporting, which suggests that banks seem 
to acknowledge their non-financial responsibilities towards society. All four Australian banks address 
sustainability in their Annual Report, while also publishing a separate Sustainability Report. The 
data shows that most banks publish a separate Sustainability Report, while simultaneously including 
sustainability information alongside financial information in Annual Reports, which indicates increased 
integrated reporting.
Integrated reporting is defined as “[…] a concise communication about how an organization’s strategy, 
governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation 
of value in the short, medium and long term.” Its proponents argue: “[…] the irresistible force of 
transparency has met the immovable object of an outdated and even dangerous model of reporting,” 
the example of this outdated model being the near collapse of the global financial system. Integrated 
reporting, “[…] provides a single version of the truth to all concerned parties, inside and out.”28
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Sustainability reporting ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 8/8 11/11 7/7
Stand-alone report ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 6/8 11/11 6/7
Integrated report ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 5/8 10/11 6/7
GRI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 6/8 9/11 6/7
Independently checked ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 5/6* 6/9* 2/6*
GRI application level ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ 1/6* 5/9* 4/6*
* Banks using the global reporting initiative framework
It is important to note that the spread of environmental and social information between Annual and 
Sustainability Reports, as identified in the sample of banks, indicates that the move towards fully 
integrated reporting is still in a transitional stage. This suggests that non-financial performance is not yet 
considered central to banking operations, and the financial bottom line is still viewed as separate – and 
superior – to social and environmental issues. Integrated reporting does not offer a panacea that negates 
conflict between non-financial and financial matters, but rather considers the issues side by side to 
paint an all-encompassing picture. 
Guidance
The well-known disclosure guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) have been widely 
adopted: all Australian banks and many banks from other regions use the GRI framework to guide their 
sustainability disclosures. Apart from the Australian banks, not every bank obtains external assurance 
for GRI disclosures, meaning that only a limited number of banks obtain third-party confirmation of the 
accuracy of their disclosures. Furthermore, not all banks reveal application levels, which they can verify 
using the GRI framework to indicate the scope of their reporting, using a list of required disclosures. 
The figures concerning the application levels and external assurance raise doubts about the scope 
and accuracy of reporting, and confirm research showing that companies often make inconsistent GRI 
claims.29 Concerns about information asymmetry in sustainability reporting are amplified by research 
that shows that increased GRI reporting has not significantly empowered civil society stakeholders.30 
Moreover, there are examples of big accounting firms providing external assurance to banks prior to the 
occurrence of major scandals, such as Barclay’s31 connection to $US 360 trillion interest rate-fixing32, or 
HSBC’s33 role in money laundering for drug cartels and terrorists. 34
Despite Australian banks seemingly outperforming their global counterparts on the voluntary reporting 
indicators, justified doubts exist about how far these indicators effectively gauge sustainable banking. 
Indeed, the seemingly excellent disclosure performance of Australian banks has not hindered 
misconduct: the Australian Securities and Investments Commission is conducting an industry-wide 
investigation into rate fixing in the Australian financial sector35, while the financial planning divisions      
of CBA36 and NAB37 have been ridden with scandal due to dodgy financial advice, and Westpac has 
been linked to global money laundering.38 Worryingly, none of these transgressions came to light in the 
banks’ reporting.
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Environmental Transparency 
The majority of banks are transparent about environmental performance, in addition to establishing 
quantifiable performance targets. Banks from Australia, Europe and North America seem to outperform 
their Asian counterparts. Levels of transparency and the existence of environmental targets are 
commendable, yet it is important to note that transparency is often mistakenly understood to be a 
straightforward concept. In reality, transparency has many dimensions, namely who discloses to whom, 
and what is disclosed to meet what ends?39
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Transparency ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 5/8 11/11 7/7
Targets ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 4/8 10/11 5/7
CDP ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 5/8 10/11 7/7
Research finds that corporate environmental performance is often pursued and disclosed 
opportunistically.40 For example, a decrease in environmental costs positively affects financial 
performance, in part mediated through enhanced corporate reputation.41 Opportunistic use of 
environmental information can be hazardous, as it can potentially erode instead of building corporate 
legitimacy: feigning or exaggerating environmental performance can backfire and harm a company’s 
image.42 Reputation incentives can also result in uninspired action, allowing banks to maintain risk levels 
while meeting stakeholder demands by copying practices of peers, or by applying non-aspirational 
industry standards.43  
In the sample, environmental transparency most commonly manifests in carbon emissions disclosures, 
specifically through participation in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). While participation is high, 
doubts exist whether CDP disclosures are valuable for investors, civil society, and policy makers, as 
they are associated with uncertainty about organisational boundaries.44 For example, a 2013 study 
found that the Royal Bank of Scotland’s fossil fuel deals led to a carbon footprint of up to 1,200 times 
the reported emissions, 1.6 times as high as the emissions of the UK in 2012.45 For Australian banks, 
the scope of emissions reporting does not include the $AUD 36.7 billion invested in the fossil fuel 
industry since 2008.46
Social Transparency
An obstacle in assessing social performance is that the bank’s functioning in this area can be difficult 
to quantify. Unlike carbon emissions, water usage, waste production and energy consumption, factors 
such as human rights, labour issues and community concerns are typically expressed qualitatively. 
Although banks might feature rich descriptions of case studies in their reports, this information fails to 
paint a complete picture of the bank’s social performance, and does not allow for cross-company or 
regional comparisons. What is required is a coherent method for banks to measure and disclose their 
social performance.
Recent changes to the ASX listing requirements involve disclosure of information on social risks.47 
However, compliance is achieved simply by referring to sections of Annual and Sustainability Reports. A 
globally recognised tool such as ISO26000 offers guidance on socially responsible enterprise and could 
structure reporting. It was established after “[…] negotiations between many different stakeholders 
across the world. Representatives from government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), industry, 
consumer groups and labour organisations around the world were involved in its development, which 
means it represents an international consensus.”48 
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
ISO 26000 ✘ ✘ ✘  ✘ 5/8 2/11 0/7
Yet in the sample none of the Australian banks, and only a limited number of the banks from other 
regions, expressly mention using ISO26000 guidance regarding their operations. Although WBC 
does refer to ISO26000, it does so in its supplier code of conduct, requiring providers of goods and 
services to adhere to practices in line with ISO2600 guidance. While WBC’s focus on its supply chain 
is commendable, resulting in the bank outperforming its Australian counterparts, WBC simultaneously 
externalises its social responsibilities by shifting obligations towards its suppliers, and misses the 
opportunity to lead by example.
A recent report by Oxfam Australia showed involvement of the big four banks in improper land 
acquisition: WBC through its relation with a controversial logging company in Papua New Guinea, CBA 
and ANZ through relations with companies sourcing sugar cane in Brazil and Cambodia, and NAB 
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through involvement in the palm oil industry.49 While NAB and WBC have since changed their policies 
to reduce the risk of financing land grabs, CBA and ANZ are yet to adopt zero tolerance to land grabs in 
financial relations.50 While these actions deserve some credit, they are nonetheless reactive and come 
into effect after the damage has been done. 
While not providing a failsafe, adoption of ISO26000 guidance could have enabled the banks to identify 
and mitigate the risk of involvement in improper land acquisition, introducing a precautionary strategy in 
social risk management. Yet, adoption of ISO26000 guidance alone is unlikely to be effective. Successful 
management of social risks depends on “[…] key areas such as management systems; integration 
of strategy, operations, technology, CSR (corporate social responsibility) and quality; incorporation of 
corporate governance; and improvements in third-party certification and internal auditing practices.”51
 
Summary
Theoretically, voluntary reporting frameworks improve business transparency, and can assist in 
formulating and achieving social and environmental objectives. However, the preceding analysis 
demonstrates that voluntary reporting does not offer a silver bullet and has a number of weaknesses. 
For example, non-financial reporting is not yet fully integrated into financial reporting. This suggests that 
social and environmental matters are considered a sideshow instead of a core issue, while the economic 
bottom line of banks continues to reign supreme.   
Furthermore, there is a lot of discretion on the part of banks when choosing what reporting guidelines 
to follow and what information to disclose, which depends on where, when and what non-financial 
data is considered to be material to business operations. This situation results in discriminatory and 
opportunistic disclosures, allowing banks to enhance their corporate reputation without addressing all 
underlying concerns. Consequently, it is unlikely that the current voluntary disclosure regime of banks 
can help to align incentives, and reduce social and environmental information asymmetry.
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3. RESPONSIBLE FINANCE
This chapter examines the provision of responsible financial services and products. The indicators 
consider whether banks offer services and products commonly deemed responsible, such as offering 
microcredit to disadvantaged communities, as well as the provision of climate products aimed at 
improving the environment. The chapter furthermore assesses whether banks practise socially 
responsible investing (SRI), while examining social and environmental risk management and the 
screening of high-risk sectors in lending practices; and lastly it takes a closer look at the validity of often 
used sustainability indices.
Products and Services 
Despite financial scandals and crises, there is ongoing belief in financial solutions to social and 
environmental issues. Reliance on financial solutions to issues that are not exclusively financial is 
problematic, as market-driven responsibilities do not always equate with responsibilities towards 
the community.52 For example, shareholder primacy, acting in the interest of your shareholders, may 
contradict acting in the best interest of wider stakeholders. It is also vital to note that the social or 
environmental value of a product or service is not intrinsic: instead, the entire range of products and 
services a bank provides determines the value.
According to John Ruggie, author of the seminal work on business and human rights that bears his 
name, “[…] there is no equivalent to buying carbon offsets in human rights, philanthropic good deeds 
do not compensate for infringing on human rights.”53 Even offsetting of carbon emissions is controversial 
and often branded as ‘polluting without the guilt’. The fundamental problem with carbon offsetting 
occurs when the link between the counterbalancing product and the actual reduction of emissions is 
severed, which can occur due to difficulties in measuring emissions, or fraud. Thus, offering responsible 
products and services does not simply absolve banks from social and environmental wrongdoing. 
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Microcredit ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 5/8 10/11 7/7
Climate products ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ 5/8 8/11 5/7
SRI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 4/8 10/11 6/7
Consequently, although the Australian banks and many peers from other regions offer microcredit, 
provide climate products and services, and are furthermore involved in socially responsible investing - 
among which are projects or businesses related to renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and green 
infrastructure, the material test to determine whether banks truly practise sustainable and responsible 
financing is to examine their most controversial financial activities. Thus the next section will take a 
closer look at social and environmental risk management and the screening of high-risk sectors.
Risk Management and Sector Screening 
In the Australia Institute survey, only 32% of respondents believe that banks should provide financing 
for projects even if there are social and environmental risks. The majority of Australian and other 
banks in the sample state that they evaluate environmental risk. Although this is encouraging, many 
environmental outcomes will only become evident over time, making it essential to apply a time 
scale that allows environmental consequences to manifest.54 This fact illustrates the urgent need for 
a precautionary turn in risk management. Despite Australian banks stating that they screen high-
risk sectors before making lending decisions, they nevertheless continue to fund a wide range of 
unsustainable activities.
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Environmental Policy ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 8/8 10/11 7/7
Environmental risk 
management ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
5/8 11/11 7/7
Sector Screening ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ 6/8 10/11 7/7
Equator Principles ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 2/8 8/11 6/7
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For example, since 2008, the big Australian banks have provided $AUD 36.7 billion in funding to the 
fossil fuel industry in Australia.55 An example of such a loan is the Maules Creek coalmine in New South 
Wales, financed by a $1.2 billion loan, with ANZ contributing $AUD 325 million, while CBA, NAB and 
WBC each put in $100 million. Local communities, including traditional land owners, are opposed to 
the construction of the mine, which is associated with deforestation, endangering vulnerable species, air 
pollution, competition for water resources and a billion tones of CO2
 emissions over the mine’s life span.56
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In addition, when considering both coal and gas projects, in the period 2008 to 2012 alone the four 
banks funded $AUD 3.8 billion worth of projects affecting the Great Barrier Reef, a World Heritage site.57 
In addition to projects already funded, another controversial plan is the development of the Alpha Coal 
project. The proposed coalmine and associated rail and port infrastructure will produce and transport 
around 30 million tonnes of coal annually, linking the mine in the Galilee Basin in Queensland to a port 
495 km further north via a railway.58  
The mine would impact over 20,000 hectares of land, threaten endangered species, and emit 65 million 
tonnes of CO2 annually. Associated port expansions would result in construction and dredging along 
the Great Barrier Reef, a World Heritage site, placing this area at risk.59 Although it has not yet been 
fully funded, ANZ is advising on the financing of the project, and a funding arrangement similar to the 
Maules Creek coalmine will likely be finalised. 
Apart from endangering the environment, banks also provide financing for other unsustainable activities. 
For example, from 2011 to March 2014, the banks under examination provided $AUD 112.2 billion† to 
nuclear arms manufacturers, $AUD 3.6 billion of which was lent by Australian banks.60 The report by 
PAX and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons profiles eight financial institutions that 
have banned investments in nuclear weapons and another 27 that have taken steps but have not yet 
fully divested. The Australian banks are not part of these groups.
Banks do apply responsible financial principles to lending activities.‡ The well-known Equator Principles 
are used as an instrument to determin and control environmental and social risks in project finance, 
such as infrastructure projects. A common criticism is the distinct focus on project finance, as its share 
is small compared to the value of global banking assets: $USD 321.3 billion61 vs. $USD 156 trillion.62 
Furthermore, the project component allows for discriminatory application of the principles, and the 
voluntary nature prevents enforcement.63 
Despite all four Australian banks applying the Equator Principles, they also continue to finance activities 
that contradict these commitments. Furthermore, when the Equator Principles are applied, such as in 
the case of the Alpha Coal project, the far-reaching and adverse project impacts do not seem to discount 
its realisatio . In other cases, such as the Maules Creek coalmine or the Liquified Natural Gas project in 
Papua New Guinea64, the Equator Principles are simply not considered. This suggests that the guidance 
provided by the Equator Principles is inadequate, not universally applied, or simply ignored. 
Loans to the Australian Fossil Fuel Industry
† Using average US$ - AUD$ exchange rate for this period. Excludes banks with <0.5% holdings
‡ The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment are not considered, as these principles are more relevant to investment banks than retail banks.
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Sustainability Indices
A growing number of sustainability indices gauge the environmental and social performance of 
companies. These indices are useful to investors, as research has shown there is a link between the 
(perceived) environmental and social functioning of a company and its financial performance.65 Well-
known sustainability indices are the FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI). Many 
banks in the sample are part of both indices, and ANZ was named as the global banking leader in the 
DJSI six times in the last seven years.
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
DJSI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 2/8 8/11 6/7
FTSE4Good ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ 2/8 10/11 6/7
Yet, how can ANZ achieve this credit if it is the largest funder of coal mining and related infrastructure 
projects in Australia? A closer look at the indices reveals a number of other dubious constituents. For 
example, at the time of writing, food and beverage giant Nestlé is included in the top ten of both the 
FTSE4Good and the DJSI66, despite social and environmental controversies in past67 and present times.68 
In addition, Apple Inc. leads the FTSE4Good index69 despite widespread criticisms concerning labour 
rights violations in its supply chain.70 
Research into sustainability indices raises additional issues, such as the lack of standardisation 
and credibility of information, as well as rating bias, and lack of transparency and independence.71 
Furthermore, methodologies and calculation of rankings are of vital importance but frequently opaque.72 
It is also argued that the indices promote a narrow view of corporate responsibility: certain areas of 
performance are made increasingly visible, leaving others underexposed.73
Consequently, it is highly questionable if these sustainability indices truly gauge the social and 
environmental performance of banks. The high rating of firms with dubious track records can perhaps 
be explained by research which shows that investors are inclined to reward firms that display overall 
positive behaviour, rather than to exclude companies based on certain unsustainable products or 
practices.74 Thus, from an investor perspective, banks can be absolved from wrongdoing by offsetting 
their unsustainable activities with sustainable ones.
Summary
So what are the implications for responsible finance, in the shape of products and services, risk 
management, sector screening, principles and indices? The evident schism between regular finance and 
ethical variants is difficult - if not plain impossible - to reconcile. Unsustainable products and services 
cannot simply be ‘offset’, while risk management and the screening of high-risk sectors falls short and 
lacks the necessary precautionary approach, as evidenced by ongoing investment in unsustainable 
activities, while the DJSI and FTSE4Good indices fail to adequately measure the non-financial 
performance of banks. 
A number of questions about responsible finance remain: can financial value creation coexist with the 
creation of non-financial values, or will it be based on a minimal degree of social and environmental 
responsibility and a maximum return on investment? Is responsible finance indicative of a sincere 
commitment to society and the environment, or is it merely market rhetoric? Regrettably, the evidence 
in this chapter suggests the latter is true. Voluntary responsible finance initiatives fall short in aligning 
incentives of banks and the community, and also in reducing social and environmental risk.
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4. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Stakeholder engagement encourages consensus building and avoidance or minimisation of risks to 
people and the environment.75 Making stakeholders central to moral corporate discourse also increases 
the chance of making social progress.76 Yet, stakeholder engagement does not always have moral 
motives, and can be aimed at knowledge gathering, human resource management and legitimisation. 
It should thus not be seen as corporate responsibility in action, but rather as an initiative that can be 
related to corporate responsibility.77 
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Identifies stakeholders ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 6/8 10/11 7/7
Explains engagement ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 6/8 10/11 7/7
The majority of banks in the sample identify stakeholders and explain methods of engagement.             
It is crucial to note that, due to the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraphs, present times 
are characterised by growing stakeholder scepticism. As a result, banks must carefully decide how 
to convey commitments towards their stakeholders. Recognising this fact will help banks to take 
greater responsibility for their activities.78 However, research shows that when companies are faced 
with increasing pressure to be accountable to a number of stakeholders, decisions to implement      
standards are frequently made based on cost-benefit calculations, neglecting broadly defined 
stakeholder interests.79 
Internal Stakeholders
Stakeholder engagement has internal and external dimensions. Moral managing of staff entails 
considering employees as a resource to be treated with respect. Moral management would seek out 
fair dealings with employees, and employ a consultative and participative leadership style, focused on 
harvesting mutual confidence and trust.80 Concerning the internal social conduct of banks in the sample, 
the majority report on their employee engagement, providing training and education to staff, diversity 
initiatives, and actively obtaining staff feedback. 
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Training and 
education ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
8/8 10/11 7/7
Diversity and 
opportunities ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
7/8 11/11 7/7
Staff Feedback ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 5/8 11/11 5/7
Although the Australian banks report that they manage staff in a moral manner, there are numerous 
cases that contradict these claims. For example, despite enormous profits, a number of restructures81 
and offshoring82 of jobs in recent years has resulted in thousands of job losses.83 Moreover, a look at the 
representation of women in leadership positions and the remuneration of women compared to men – 
gives rise to further doubts. 84 In comparison to other industries, banks in Australia have fewer women in 
management positions, while the base salary and the total pay gap at banks is greater.§
 
§ Figures are based on 25 banks and 4,329 other organisations in Australia that reported to the Australian Government’s Workplace Gender Equality Agency in 2014.
HOW DOES SUSTAINABLE BANKING ADD UP. A CATALYST REPORT  16
External Stakeholders
When considering external stakeholder engagement, banks frequently devote resources to public 
outreach and community engagement. Moral management of community stakeholders involves 
considering a vital community as a business goal that is worth actively pursuing. Leading firms would, 
for example, focus on environmental issues, education, culture, and volunteerism. Moral management 
would consider community and company goals as mutually interdependent.85
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Community 
involvement ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
8/8 11/11 7/7
Sponsoring ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 7/8 11/11 7/7
All banks in the sample mention that they are in some way engaged in the community. All banks but 
one report that they sponsor public events. These figures suggest a worthy effort by banks to engage 
their external stakeholders. Optimism is tempered by research that shows a clear philanthropic 
strategy is frequently lacking in community investment86, as well as by studies showing that “[…] 
external stakeholders are not integrated on a regular but on a case-by-case basis and most of the time 
interaction takes place in a situation of crisis”.87 
Despite the seemingly widespread community involvement of Australian banks, there are some 
examples where their interests conflict with the interests of the wider community. As mentioned, 
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thousands of Australians lost their life savings because of inappropriate advice given to them by financial 
planners. Another conflict between Australian banks and society concerns a class action over disputed 
late payment fees.88 In the largest collective legal action in Australia’s history, over 185,000 people who 
claim to have been charged unfair fees are attempting to redeem their money, claiming over $AUD 
240 million.89 Although the Federal Court over-ruled an earlier decision that branded late payment fees 
as illegal, the matter will most likely be taken to the High Court.90 Regardless of the verdict, Australian 
banks have had to square off against 185,000 citizens.
Multistakeholder Initiatives 
Bringing multiple stakeholders together to participate in dialogue, decision-making and formulating 
solutions to social and environmental issues encourages transparent and accountable business 
enterprise. It allows for participation of the stakeholders that are most directly impacted by business 
enterprise and often have little opportunity to voice their concerns. The United Nations Global Compact 
(UNGC) and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI) are two well-known 
initiatives. All four Australian banks partake in these initiatives, while participation rates are lower in 
other regions.
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
UNGC ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 4/8 8/11 1/7
UNEP-FI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 4/8 7/11 4/7
The UNGC is an international multistakeholder forum that relies on the adoption of ten principles across 
four areas: human rights, labour standards, environment, and anti-corruption.91 While the UNGC is 
often lauded, it has only had modest impact on corporate responsibility.92 It is criticised for the alleged 
dominance of corporate interests, vague principles, and a failure to validate fulfilment of the principles.93 
Firms mostly benefit through networking and enhancing corporate reputation.94 Proponents argue that 
the UNGC should be seen as an addition to incomplete state and non-state regulation.95 Yet, companies 
are less likely to be delisted from the UNGC in countries where institutions function well96, which 
suggests that the initiative does not offer a substitute for weak or absent governance.
The UNEP-FI facilitates dialogue between the community and private sector companies, with the aim 
of promoting sustainability in business operations.97 In order to become a signatory, financial companies 
must adhere to a statement, which dictates that activities are compatible with social and environmental 
welfare. Signatories express commitment to sustainability, but are not accountable, nor do penalties exist 
for non-compliance. It follows that criticism of the UNEP-FI is similar to that of the UNGC and mainly 
concerns the absence of enforcement, while rebuttals likewise state that the initiative should be seen as 
filling the gap left by incomplete private and public policy.
The fact that the UNGC and the UNEP-FI do not fill the gap caused by weak or absent governance 
frameworks is best illustrated by the occurrence of land grabs in emerging markets, financed by the 
big four Australian banks. While bringing together stakeholders to participate in a dialogue about 
responsible financial enterprise is laudable, it has not served the victims of improper land acquisition 
well, nor did the UNGC principles or the UNEP-FI statement prevent these land grabs. Without 
accountability, enforcement and penalties for non-compliance, the UNGC principles or the UNEP-FI 
statement regrettably are not worth the paper they are written on.
Summary
At first sight, Australian and overseas banks seem to engage well with internal and external stakeholders. 
Yet, there is evidence that reveals a different picture. The purported extent of internal and external 
stakeholder engagement has not solved existing employee and community issues, as shown by the 
continuing underrepresentation and underpayment of women in leadership, in addition to thousands of 
layoffs despite enormous profits, as well as banks being faced with the largest class action in Australian 
history. It appears that stakeholder and community engagement is driven by reputation incentives, given 
that previous sections show that banks are often motivated to enhance their corporate image.
This supposition is verified by research showing a lack of detailed community investment and 
engagement strategies, and studies that show companies make decisions based on a cost-benefit 
basis when faced with pressure from various stakeholder groups, therefore ignoring broadly defined 
stakeholder interests. In other words, stakeholder engagement is often opportunistic and reactive. This is 
no different for multistakeholder initiatives, which promote voluntary standards over binding regulation, 
even though they do not provide a failsafe supplementary governance framework. In sum, these 
initiatives fall short in aligning actual incentives to stated aims, in countering information asymmetry and 
reducing social and environmental risk levels.
HOW DOES SUSTAINABLE BANKING ADD UP. A CATALYST REPORT  18
5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance provides the system by which companies are directed and controlled, to 
ensure that duties are exercised according to laws, regulation and codes of conduct.98 Company 
leadership, specifically the board of directors and the executive management team, are progressively 
held responsible for the design, implementation and monitoring of sustainability objectives and 
performance.99 This is no different for banks. It is crucially important that the leadership drives 
social and environmental causes, as they create a precedent for the entire firm. However, the 
governance of sustainability is still at an early stage, as there are few directors with direct responsibility        
for sustainability.100
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Board  ✔ ✘ ✘ ✔ 1/8 6/11 6/7
Management ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ 3/8 2/11 1/7
Sustainability committees mark the priority given to sustainable governance mechanisms at the peak 
of the organisational pyramid. Half of the Australian banks have a board committee, while only one 
has a management committee that deals with sustainability matters. Yet a closer look reveals little 
real commitment, as demonstrated by the committee charters: ANZ’s Governance Committee merely 
includes an ambiguous statement that its task is to “[…] review and approve the proposed corporate 
sustainability objectives for the Company, and review progress in achieving them.”101 
The board committee at WBC that addresses sustainability, called the “Board Risk and Compliance 
Committee”, formulates a similarly general and vague statement by mentioning that the committee will 
“[…] review and approve other risk management frameworks not specifically referred to in this Charter, 
and/or review the monitoring of performance under those frameworks (as appropriate).”102 These are 
described as including “[…] other risks (including environmental, social and governance risk, equity 
risk, related entity risk, insurance risk, anti-money laundering, counter terrorism financing, bribery and 
corruption, and others as identified by the Committee).”103
At the executive management level, ANZ’s “Corporate Sustainability & Diversity Committee” is somewhat 
more encouraging. The committee is described as “[…] a strategic leadership body performing an 
oversight, advisory and advocacy role in achieving the Group’s agenda and priorities.”104 Its purpose is 
to advise management and other governance bodies, set strategies, policies and targets, and ensure 
leading practice in the management and disclosure of corporate sustainability. Yet the committee’s 
efficiency is questionable, as ANZ is the largest funder of coal mining projects in Australia, and has 
lead the funding efforts of the Maules Creek mine as well as the Alpha Coal Project. Therefore, while a 
management focus on sustainability issues is laudable and desirable, it does not automatically mean 
that adverse impacts are avoided. 
Overall, the findings suggest that leadership in banks is not commonly focused on, or driving, social 
and environmental strategy. Indeed, the fact that leadership – management specifically - needs to 
make significant advances in the area of governance is illustrated by the comments of employees 
involved in the Australian financial planning scandal, who want to “[…] bring to light senior 
management as the drivers of much that is wrong in the industry. Until senior managers are named 
and shamed the bank will continue to chew through the bottom ranks as the body count rises as an 
accepted cost of doing business.”105 
Business Ethics
Research shows that “[…] prevailing business culture in the banking industry weakens and undermines 
the honesty norm.”106 The majority of banks, including all four Australian banks, have formulated 
and disclosed a code of conduct outlining appropriate behaviour and ethics.  It is important to note 
that some corporate governance regimes, such as the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, require listed companies to establish a code of conduct and to publicly disclose 
at least a summary of the code. Thus the compliance of Australian banks is not surprising. More 
remarkable is the considerable divergence in the types of codes, their content, and whom they apply to.
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Code of Conduct ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 6/8 11/11 7/7
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For example, CBA lists eleven codes of conduct on its website, of which only five have been made 
public.107 Despite the description in the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 
it is unclear which of the codes describes “[…] the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the 
company’s integrity, to take into account their legal obligations and the reasonable expectations of their 
stakeholders, and the responsibility and accountability of individuals for reporting and investigating 
reports of unethical practices.”108
WBC’s code “[…] describes the standards of conduct expected of our people, both employees and 
contractors […] to help us make the right decision every time.”109 It is unclear whether the code applies 
to directors as well. Another document, called the “Principles for Doing Business”, sets out WBC’s 
“[…] commitment to sustainable business practice.”110 Similar to the code of conduct, the Principles 
do not seem to apply to directors: “[…] employees and contractors who breach the Code of Conduct or 
Our Principles may face disciplinary action including termination of employment or termination of their 
contracts.”111 
ANZ has codes of conduct for its staff112 and its directors.113 In the codes, the bank states that it “[…] 
aims to deliver superior long-term total shareholder return, taking proper account of employees, 
customers and others with whom we do business as well as the communities and environments 
in which ANZ operates. In striving to achieve these aims, we should not compromise our ethics or 
principles.”114 While the codes apply to staff and directors, they suffer from the shareholder primacy 
paradox: what happens when the focus on maximising shareholder profits conflicts with community and 
environmental factors?
This paradox is also present in NAB’s code of conduct, in which the bank states it is “[…] committed 
to achieving sustainable performance and delivering value to our customers and shareholders while 
maintaining our beliefs, behaviours and trusted reputation.”115 Yet, the bank does not explicitly mention 
what sustainable performance means. While the code mentions “community and respects human 
rights”, it does not mention the environment. Overall, it is unclear which codes of conduct apply to 
whom, while the principles in the codes are often vaguely formulated and can at times be contradictory.
More importantly, it should be noted that the codes of conduct are accompanied by different 
accountability mechanisms. For staff members, directors and parties with whom banks are engaged 
in contractual relationships, the codes of conduct express duties, which means that transgression can 
result in the termination of employment or the business relationship. Yet, for community stakeholders, 
the codes of conduct convey social norms, meaning that transgression results in public disapproval. 
Consequently, societal stakeholders can use the codes of conduct to question a bank’s social license to 
operate.
Remuneration
In general, firms are increasingly integrating non-financial elements into their remuneration structures, 
although still to a limited extent and in a narrow manner. Research using data covering 3,512 
international companies shows that only ten companies linked staff remuneration to environmental 
and social performance at the board level, while only 32 firms did so at executive management 
level.116 A study covering 600 publicly listed companies demonstrates that 7% explicitly link executive 
compensation to social and environmental matters, while an additional 9% of companies do so without 
making reference to targets and weighting of social and environmental issues.117
Indicator ANZ CBA NAB WBC Asia Europe N. America
Non-financial 
performance ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
0/8 8/11 2/7
Health & Safety 
performance ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
0/0* 0/8* 0/2*
Environmental 
performance ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘
0/0* 0/8 * 0/2*
Customer 
satisfaction ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘
0/0* 4/8* 1/2*
Employee 
satisfaction ✔ ✘ ✔ ✘
0/0* 1/8* 1/2*
Community ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ 0/0* 2/8* 0/2*
* Banks that incorporate non-financial measures in remuneration
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This report looks at a number of non-financial performance measures relating to executive management 
compensation. Sixteen banks mention that they link non-financial measures to remuneration of 
executive management. Only a few banks further elaborate on specific performance areas. Considering 
the figures in other studies, banks in the sample seem to perform above average. Yet, a closer look 
shows that customer and employee satisfaction are mentioned most often, which is unsurprising 
considering their link to financial performance. Conversely, health and safety, environmental 
performance and community indicators are linked to remuneration to a lesser extent or not at all.
Remuneration structures that integrate environmental and social performance are often considered a 
missing piece of the corporate responsibility puzzle. 118 In the survey, 58% of respondents believe that 
rewards in the banking sector should be linked to social and environmental performance. Yet, several 
hurdles are associated with linking remuneration to environmental and social goals. Challenges concern 
balancing of short and long-term objectives, as well as the quantifying and weighting of environmental 
and social measures. 119 The major concern here is that the percentage of compensation related to 
environmental and social measures may be small and unlikely to be a significant motivator, especially 
compared to bonus packages linked to profits.120
While all four Australian banks have incorporated non-financial performance in the remuneration 
schemes of senior management, there are indications that it should be a part of remuneration schemes 
throughout the entire organisation. For example, remuneration structures in one of the scandal-ridden 
financial planning divisions in Australia are said to have “[…] a heavy bias to product sales and new 
clients rather than existing clients.”121 This suggests that, beyond integrating non-financial indicators in 
the remuneration of the executive management team, compensation structures throughout the banking 
sector need to be balanced in order to abolish perverse performance incentives. 
Summary
The figures suggest that social and environmental matters are not commonly prioritised at the board or 
management levels of banks, nor does the leadership convincingly champion sustainability strategies. 
Relevant committees either do not exist or inadequately address sustainability issues, as evidenced 
by the range of banking malpractices outlined in this report. While business ethics are described in 
codes of conduct, it is not always apparent to whom they apply, nor are social and environmental 
responsibilities clearly formulated. In addition, banks create a moral conundrum by emphasising 
shareholder profits together with their social and environment commitments.
Although banks link non-financial measures into executive compensation, social and environmental 
objectives are inadequately integrated, as shown by the emphasis on customer and employee 
satisfaction, which suggests profit and reputation motives. Overall, it should be noted that these 
indicators only reveal a part of corporate governance mechanisms in banks. Yet the earlier discussion of 
lending policies and risk management, particularly the continued financing of unsustainable activities, 
suggests environmental and social matters are not generally integrated into corporate governance 
systems. If those systems are authoritatively regulated – they can achieve increased accountability and 
the embedding of sustainability principles in banking strategies. 
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6. DISCUSSION
The report examined how two conflicting images of the big four banks can exist side-by-
side: that of the banks as lauded sustainable enterprises, and conversely their involvement 
in a range of financial scandals and unsustainable activities. Furthermore, in the context 
of the Financial System Inquiry, which failed to address the social and environmental 
responsibilities of banks, as well as the decade-old parliamentary inquiry into corporate 
responsibility, which favoured voluntary initiatives over legal amendments and mandatory 
requirements, the report asked why it is that banks are allowed to continue to self-regulate 
social and environmental matters, while national and global financial regulation is becoming 
stricter following financial misconduct and the global financial crisis. 
The report then proceeded to examine sustainability in the Australian and global banking 
sector. Specifically, it assessed self-regulatory and voluntary measures aimed at enabling 
socially and environmentally responsible banking practices. Extending earlier research into 
banking and corporate sustainability informed this analysis, while the report also set out to 
critically assess these indicators to verify whether they form accurate sustainability proxies. 
The material test was formed by three key challenges: addressing misaligned incentives, 
information asymmetry, and social and environmental risk levels. 
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FINDINGS 
The research shows that misaligned incentives are not effectively countered. While banks make some 
efforts to combine profit with environmental and social goals, they do not do enough. Banking products 
and services have a two-faced nature, while stakeholder engagement, a tool that can align incentives, 
is often quoted but is accompanied by many examples where stakeholders have been disadvantaged. 
Moreover, partaking in multistakeholder initiatives and adopting related principles lacks credibility, due 
to the absence of serious consequences for non-compliance. Non-financial measures are increasingly 
included in remuneration, but the focus on customer and employee satisfaction suggests self-interested 
motives, while the implementation of sustainability in governance was inadequate, suggesting that social 
and environmental matters are of limited concern to leadership in banks. In sum, the report provides a 
host of examples where banks do not have community interests at heart.
Doubts also arose regarding how banks address information asymmetry. The report established that 
there are several levels of commitment to voluntary sustainability reporting among banks, concerning 
the scope and accuracy of disclosed information. Despite an extensive uptake of reporting tools, as well 
as external assurance by accounting firms, increased disclosures have not prevented environmental, 
social and governance controversies from occurring. Doubts likewise exist about the effectiveness of 
stakeholder engagement, as well as responsible and sustainable finance: in many cases, stakeholders 
only become aware of unsustainable banking activities following action taken by civil society 
organisations. This simultaneously verifies that sustainability indices are mostly questionable, providing 
high ratings despite dubious business practices. In all, the report shows a substantial discrepancy 
between what banks say and what they do.
The management of environmental and social risks by banks falls short. While risk assessment and 
the screening of high-risk sectors are frequently mentioned, banks nevertheless continue to finance 
unsustainable activities. The adoption of voluntary codes and involvement in multistakeholder 
sustainability initiatives is shown to come at little cost, while the lack of enforcement inhibits increased 
accountability, allowing for business to resume as usual. Responsible products and services cannot be 
used to compensate for unsustainable activities. Clearly there would be no need to single out a product 
or service as ‘responsible’ if banks would adopt an overarching sustainable business strategy. The 
voluntary responsible finance initiatives of banks do not represent a strong commitment to reduce social 
and environmental risk levels, but instead predominantly denote market rhetoric.
Summarising, this report shows that the self-regulatory social and environmental measures of banks 
have largely resulted in symbolic outcomes. Although the banks have created an image of responsible 
corporate citizenship, additional probes reveal contradictions and shortcomings that debunk this 
portrayal. The question that follows is whether self-regulatory efforts should be seen as entirely symbolic: 
do banks merely try to adhere to societal expectations without truly changing, or is part of their effort 
genuinely aimed at social and environmental improvement? A balanced view would be that some efforts 
are symbolic, while others are substantive. Do the symbolic initiatives merely serve as a legitimacy 
front for banks, obscuring unsustainable activities, or are they a sign of uneven progress and will they 
eventually develop into substantial activities? Either way, the governance gap created by the present self-
regulatory and voluntary sustainability paradigm will need to be overcome.
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BRIDGING THE GOVERNANCE GAP
Business enterprises are subject to three distinct but interrelated governance systems: that of public 
law and authority; a non-state system revolving around civil society and stakeholders; and the system of 
corporate governance - where the latter reflects the requirements of the previous two, albeit to varying 
degrees.122 The discussed Inquiries demonstrate that the Government foresees a modest role for public 
law and authority in the governance of social and environmental matters concerning companies, while 
the system of corporate governance shows promise but has not yet fulfilled its potential. The non-state 
governance system spurred on by civil society is fulfilling its role as watchdog well, as shown by media 
and NGO reports on controversies involving banks and other companies.
As mentioned at the beginning of this report, the 2005 Government Inquiry into Corporate Responsibility 
and Triple Bottom Line Reporting found that legal amendments were undesirable, as it was deemed 
“[…] not appropriate to mandate the consideration of stakeholder interests into directors’ duties”, while 
sustainability reporting was to remain voluntary, as “[…] mandatory reporting would lead to a ‘tick-
the-box’ culture of compliance.”123 Ironically, voluntary sustainability reporting has resulted in a similar 
box ticking exercise, but rather than complying with the law this exercise is instead aimed at societal 
expectations. The fact that directors’ duties were not reformulated to cover stakeholder interests has, 
unsurprisingly, resulted in stakeholder issues remaining of relatively minor concern to company boards.
The argument here is not purely to expand the role of public law and authority. 
Although additional regulation can potentially decrease risks associated with unsustainable finance, 
such a measure would also externalise responsibilities to a certain extent: by only embedding social 
and environmental responsibilities into corporate law, what is required of banks and companies is to 
be law-abiding. This would embed social and environmental sustainability in legal frameworks, rather 
than necessarily in business models. Yet, redefining the responsibilities of company directors, to include 
stakeholder, social and environmental concerns, would anchor responsibilities in the rule of law, while 
leaving a suitable amount of discretion and incentive on the part of companies to meet this requirement.
Reformulating the duties of company directors is not a new or radical idea: “[…] it may be a breach of 
fiduciary duties to fail to take account of [environmental, social and governance] considerations that are 
relevant and to give them appropriate weight, bearing in mind that some important economic analysts 
and leading financial institutions are satisfied that a strong link between good [environmental, social 
and governance] performance and good financial performance exists.”124 Indeed, the areas of corporate 
social responsibility and corporate governance are converging 125, which suggests that the legal and 
moral responsibilities of corporate leadership progressively overlap.126 Thus, narrow views on corporate 
governance stressing legal and accounting compliance, with a focus on shareholder returns, are 
gradually supplemented by views that include a social and environmental focus and concern for wider 
stakeholder groups.127
The nature of corporate social responsibility differs from corporate governance in that it is voluntary, 
while corporate governance is anchored in corporate law and (coercive) stock exchange listing 
requirements. Increased integration would help make social and environmental matters more 
enforceable and thus make companies more accountable, diminish the use of sustainability 
disclosures as a public relations tool, lead to the development of valid performance indicators, 
streamline disclosures while increasing comparability, and ultimately improve social and environmental 
performance. Indeed, research shows that instead of establishing obligatory sustainability disclosures, 
enhancing corporate governance quality is a more effective way to improve disclosures.128
Where corporate governance systems are optimally designed and functioning - meaning that they reflect 
the requirements of the state governance system of the rule of law and authority, as well as the public 
governance system of civil society - there will be limited need for mandatory regulatory measures and 
public shaming by civil society organisations. Yet the current configuration of the governance systems 
is off-kilter and unjustifiably favours self-regulatory and voluntary efforts. To rebalance the governance 
structures, public law and authority will need to assume a bigger role. If increased convergence between 
corporate social responsibility and corporate governance takes the shape of additional self-regulation, 
the same issues that currently inhibit sustainability issues from becoming a core part of corporate 
bottom lines will undermine it. 
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EXTENDED SUPERVISION
The assurance that financial operations are based on sustainable principles requires independent 
monitoring of compliance and performance, followed by public consultation regarding the findings, as 
NGOs and the media have been at the forefront of exposing of unethical activities, and naming and 
shaming is an effective measure.129 “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial 
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”130 
Governance, regulation and supervision should thus not be seen as measures that restrain innovation 
or entrepreneurship, but instead as instruments that can help to restore trust, and ensure that banking 
activities are conducted openly, fairly and sustainably.
Although the Financial System Inquiry did address the social and environmental responsibilities of 
banks and the role of corporate governance, regulation and supervision, this does not mean that 
Australian institutions have no role to play. It should be noted that Australian regulators are not free 
of controversy. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), which enforces laws to 
protect consumers, investors and creditors, permitted NAB lawyers into its quarters, and allowed the 
bank to alter a media release about its failures.131
In 2014, a Senate report considering ASIC’s performance recommended a Royal Commission132, but 
the Government adopted the dissenting opinion. The report of the Financial System Inquiry put forward 
a solution for regulatory capture by corporate interests, which entails establishing a body that assesses 
ASIC’s and APRA’s performance.133In other words, the watchers will need to be watched.
Nation-based regulatory action only forms one part of the governance puzzle, as corporate governance 
is also rooted in frameworks at the international level. Concerning the financial sector, institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board, and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision regulate the financial system and assure its proper functioning. Although the plethora of 
international institutions shows growing global efforts to resolve issues in the financial sector, they focus 
chiefly on sustaining economic growth and avoiding future financial crises. However, as this report 
argues, misaligned incentives, information asymmetry, and risk-levels constitute flaws where the effects 
are not limited to financial crises.
As APRA noted, the diffusion of international governance standards for the financial sector has proven 
to be economically successful in the Australian context, which suggests that there is an institutional 
basis to repeat this exercise with social and environmental governance tools. An additional argument 
in favour of formulating corporate governance in an international context is that financial issues are 
increasingly global in nature. While defining corporate governance in a global context can result in 
a more sustainable banking sector, it should be noted that reaching consensus among sovereign 
stakeholders remains a key task, as national governments and regulatory bodies remain responsible for 
implementation and enforcement. Good governance begins at home.
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A decade after the Inquiry into Corporate Responsibility and Triple Bottom Line reporting, 
the time is ripe for the Government to revisit the issue. The present emphasis on self-
regulation leaves social and environmental matters peripheral to business and banking 
strategies. Although banking supervision has become stricter after the global financial 
crisis, banks are still allowed to take a voluntary approach to social and environmental 
issues. Consequently, the market power of banks to inspire sustainable enterprise is not 
fully leveraged, while their actions continue to contribute to social and environmental 
detriment. Perversely, focus on corporate social and environmental voluntarism has created 
a governance gap that allows for unsustainable behaviour to be obscured by symbolic 
efforts. 
Yet it should not merely be the existence of mandatory regulation that prompts responsible 
behaviour by banks and companies, but the dynamics following from the interplay of 
organisational culture, industry standards, institutional settings, and public scrutiny. 
The pursuit of self-regulation aimed at aligning incentives, counteracting information 
asymmetry, and establishing appropriate levels of risk is only fruitful if associated principles 
or standards are clearly formulated, broadly mandated, actively monitored, and effectively 
integrated into corporate governance – a system which at all times should reflect the 
requirements of public law and authority, as well as civil society.
In order for social and environmental responsibilities to become a core part of business and 
banking operations, some crucial elements need to be considered.
Further aligning the incentives of banks with community interests is greatly served by 
expanding the duties of directors to take into account social and environmental elements. 
Defining disclosure requirements and enshrining these in corporate governance systems 
would help to harmonise standards, increase comparability and enhance transparency, 
while reducing information asymmetry and the occurrence of moral hazards. Finally, 
corporate risk assessments should be based on the precautionary principle: if a proposed 
activity has a suspected risk of causing harm to society or the environment, and there is no 
consensus that this activity is not harmful, the burden of proof that it is not harmful should 
fall on the prospective financiers of this activity.
Most importantly, the Government should more actively fulfil its duty as the guardian of 
public interest. The neoliberal doctrine has convinced successive governments that the role 
of the state in governing business ought to be as small as possible. 
The crux of the matter is more complex, as we have seen, and there is good reason to 
expand the role of the state to rebalance governance responsibilities. This issue is not 
limited to the topics covered in this report, but is part of a larger contemporary struggle. It 
is with good reason that the most often voiced unease about the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement concerns the proposed investor–state arbitration, which would enable 
multinationals to sue governments outside of national legal frameworks to get taxpayer 
compensation for loss of expected future profits due to government actions.134This example 
illustrates what is at the heart of the issue: unbalanced governance arrangements that 
unjustly favour the interests of companies over state authority and community welfare.
7. CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Sustainability Report
Type of Sustainability Report (Stand-alone)
Type of Sustainability Report (Integrated)
Global Reporting Initiative 
Independently checked
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Transparency of environmental performance
Quantitative environmental management targets
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Glossary
Application Levels: A matrix that outlines the level at which companies have applied the GRI in their 
performance reporting.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A body concerned with the prudential regulation of banks. The 
membership consists of 28 central banks.
Climate Products: Financial products that offer customers the opportunity to invest in organisations and 
projects that have a neutral or beneficial effect on carbon emissions.
Equator Principles: A standard developed by the United Nations for assessing environmental and social risks 
in projects.
External Assurance: A process where an independent organisation reviews and verifies a company’s reporting 
in relation to the GRI.
Fiduciary Duties: The responsibility a company director holds to act in the best interests of the company, 
predominantly defined in corporate law.
Financial Sector: Part of the economy that is primarily concerned with the transfer of money and financial 
products including borrowing and lending.
Financial Stability Board: An international body that monitors the stability of the global financial system. 
Membership consists of countries and organisations.
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI): Guidelines and indicators that streamline how to report on a range of 
matters including environmental, social and governance issues. 
International Monetary Fund: An international organisation that aims to promote and facilitate international 
trade. It currently has 188 member nations.
Information asymmetry: A situation where one party in a (financial) transaction has superior knowledge to the 
other party.
Integrated Reporting: Incorporating environmental, social, governance, and financial performance disclosures 
into a single document. 
ISO26000: Voluntary guidelines on the socially responsible behaviour of companies and other organisations.
Microcredit: Small loans typically given to people, organisations or communities experiencing poverty or 
significant hardship. 
Moral Hazards: A situation where one party in a (financial) transaction bears an uneven amount of risk 
compared to another party, which the latter party exploits. 
Market Capitalisation: The aggregated market value of shares issued by a publicly listed company.
NGOs: Non-Government Organisations exist outside government and business sectors. They generally have a 
social, political or environmental cause.
Shareholder Primacy: The practice of giving priority to shareholder interests ahead of other stakeholders of 
companies.
Social License to Operate: Refers to the level of public approval for a company and its operations.
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI): Investing in companies or activities that are considered ethical or 
sustainable. 
Sustainability indices: Indices that measure the performance of publicly listed companies based on long-
term economic, environmental and social criteria. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: A proposed trade agreement between the USA, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, New 
Zealand, Canada, Chile, Brunei, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam.
Triple Bottom Line: A reporting concept where financial, social and environmental aspects are all taken into 
account when assessing an organisation’s performance.
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC): A voluntary initiative that organisations can choose to participate in to 
improve corporate social and environmental performance. 
United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI): A body that calls on financial institutions 
to consider social and environmental impact of operations.
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